イハラ トモアキ IHARA Tomoaki
文学研究科 英米文学専攻 博士前期課程
文学研究科 文学言語学専攻 博士後期課程
|Wittgenstein on Subjectivity and the View of 'I' as Field
|40th International Wittgenstein Symposium
|Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society
|Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria
|In early 1930s Wittgenstein came to grips with the problem of subjectivity. During the period, he came to think something exclusively I have is so ineffable that the word I can be omitted in representing immediate experience. His idea in the period can be called epistemological or phenomenological solipsism.
His idea on the ellipsis of I is similar to contemporary cognitive grammarians and Merleau-Ponty in that the word I is implicit when it has no neighbor, and that the embodied I am assimilated with the field in which things happen. After acquiring the language of personal pronouns, people get into a personalized world. However, before they master it, they are undifferentiated fused embodied awareness fusing with the field. It can be seen as at the same time the existence of one and the whole and absolute subjectivity without neighbors.